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INFORMATION AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY SECURITY:   
FURTHERING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
ABSTRACT: Despite the development of advanced technical devices and procedures, the 
information held in computer systems remains vulnerable to attack and/or inadvertent 
mishandling, resulting in security breaches.  Increasingly, researchers and practitioners are 
recognising that information security is not merely a technical issue, but is heavily influenced by 
social and cultural factors.  This paper argues that post-cognitivist approaches to human computer 
interaction, which focus on situated reasoning and the contextual, relational aspects of computer-
mediated activities and interactions, provide a promising set of concepts with which to explore 
non-technical users’ everyday security practices and beliefs.  We review the limited research that 
has been conducted in this area, focussing on the relationship between security and users’ more 
immediate ‘real’ work, and their perceptions on risk, and show how it is compatible with post-
cognitivist understandings. We conclude by outlining some further areas for research. 
Keywords:   Learning organisation, Knowledge protection, Knowledge management discourse, 
Tacit knowledge, Organisational knowledge,  
Computers and the internet have had a tremendous impact on the way we store, exchange and use 
information. Many organisations are now almost completely dependent on functioning information 
systems in order to carry out their tasks. As dependence on these systems grows, however, so too 
do the threats posed by malicious elements that seek to compromise or destroy the reliability, 
confidentiality and availability of information held on systems. Security and privacy risks created 
from inadvertent mishandling of data are no less significant. Mindful of these threats, ICT experts 
have devised a plethora of technical devices and procedures for the protection of information. 
These include checklists, access control lists, firewalls, anti-virus software, passwords and 
encryption protocols (Lampson 2004; Siponen 2005).  
 
Given the amount of effort that has been expended on technological mechanisms and procedures for 
establishing and maintaining the security of information, we would expect information in most 
organisations to be adequately protected from attack and misuse.  However, this is not the case.  Many 
ICT specialists have pointed out that information systems are, in general, much less secure than they 
could or should be, and that security breaches are increasing rather than decreasing in frequency 
(Lampson 2004; Pahnila, Siponen, and Mahmood 2007; Straub and Welke 1998).  To explain this 
apparent paradox, ICT experts and researchers interested in security problems are increasingly looking 
beyond the technical aspects of systems.  There is growing realisation that future improvements in 
information security will depend not so much on sophisticated technologies as on a better 
understanding of the human and social factors that influence the way ordinary users manage security 
(or fail to) as they work (Fisk 2002; Gonzalez and Sawicka 2002).  
 
In this paper, we draw on insights from ‘post-cognitivist’ (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2003) understandings 
of human-computer interaction (HCI) to explore the prospects and problems facing researchers and IT 
practitioners attempting to understand and improve the practices through which information security is 
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(or isn’t) established and maintained.  HCI — in its cognitivist and post-cognitivist forms — has rarely 
been applied to information security (Adams and Sasse 1999; Besnard and Arief 2004; Gonzalez and 
Sawicka 2002).  The post-cognitivist form, which broadly investigates ‘how the use of technology 
emerges in social, cultural and organizational contexts’ (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2003: 692) , is a 
promising avenue through which to theorise and explore the contextual factors that impinge on 
information security, and to draw out some salient differences between practices specifically relating 
to security and other activities for which people use computers.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, we describe same of the more cogent insights advanced by post-
cognitivist HCI researchers, particularly those interested in activity theory.  Second, we draw on this 
literature to explore security actions and activities from the ‘ordinary’ (that is, non-technically 
specialised) user’s point of view.  We focus on two issues – the relationship between security practices 
and normal, ‘real’ work involving computers, and users’ perceptions of risks to the security of the 
systems they use.  Finally, we suggest some new research directions derived from our analysis.   
 
HCI AND ITS POST-COGNITIVIST DEVELOPMENTS 
 
For decades, computer scientists have found it useful and interesting to investigate how humans react 
to and use computers. Traditionally, these studies drew inspiration, concepts and methods from 
cognitive science.  As a result, they emphasised perception, information processing, memory, 
attention, and the design of effective computer interfaces (Carroll 2002).  Although this approach has 
been productive and influential, it has also been heavily criticised.  As it depends largely on artificial 
laboratory-based experiments, critics argue that the phenomena and interactions it studies are stripped 
of the contexts which, in the ‘real’ world, give computer use its meanings and purposes.  Without an 
appreciation of the social, cultural and organisational contexts in which people use computers,  any 
attempt to theorise human-computer interactions will inevitably remain limited and partial (Bannon 
2000; Kuutti 1997).   
 
Since the late 1980s, several related strands of research and theorising in HCI have attempted to 
address these shortcomings. Taking their inspiration from a range of sources, including hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, ethnomethodology and speech act theory (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2003), writers 
working under the umbrella of post-cognitivist HCI have attempted to develop comprehensive 
understandings of computer use in context. A number of similar but distinct approaches have been 
developed, including activity theory (Engström 2000; Nardi 1997), computer-supported cooperative 
work (Bowker, Star, Turner, and Gasser 1997) ethnographic studies of situated computer-mediated 
actions (Dourish, Grinter, Flor, and Joseph 2004; Suchman 1987) and distributed cognition (Hutchins 
1995). For the purposes of this paper, we outline some of the major areas of agreement among these 
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approaches that are relevant to the issue of information security.  Some areas of divergence will also be 
discussed and highlighted, as they present interesting research challenges for the application of this 
overall approach to the problem.   
 
Post-cognitivist approaches to HCI are held together by a strong interest in the ‘real-life practice of 
people situated in social and cultural contexts’ (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2003: 692).  Researchers in this 
tradition are primarily interested in what people do with and through computers, rather than how they 
process information.  Cognition is still relevant, but only insofar as it is part of the on-going flow of 
activity (Winograd and Flores 1986).  Cognition creates meanings,  but the meanings of tasks, and the 
artefacts, operations and relationships used to accomplish them, only emerge in the process of carrying 
them out (Kaptelinin 1997: 56; Winograd and Flores 1986: 70-1). In other words, an appreciation of 
the context in which computer-mediated activity occurs is vital. As Suchman (1987: 27-8) writes,  'The 
coherence of situated action is tied in essential ways not to individual predispositions or conventional 
rules but to local interactions contingent on the actor's particular circumstances'.   
 
The approaches gathered under the umbrella of post-cognitivist HCI all emphasise contingency and 
emergent action.  Consequently, they downplay or eschew the idea that actions are wholly determined 
by formal, decontextualised and a priori ‘rules’.  However, there are differences in the degree to which 
the approaches make space for concepts that more or less loosely encapsulate intent, such as goals or 
plans, or some of the more enduring features of organisational action, such as habits, divisions of 
labour, routines, and managerial and cultural expectations.  Those writing from the ‘situated action’ 
perspective, such as Suchman (1987) and Lave (1988), view plans not so much as determinants or 
guides of action, but as post hoc resources, invoked to explain actions after they have occurred 
(Suchman 1987: 27. See also Nardi 1997).  Activity theory, on the other hand, allows space for 
intentionality as a motivating force, in the form of ‘objects’ towards which actions are directed.  In this 
view, ‘objects’ are one of several elements that make up the overall structure of activities.  Subjects 
(people) pursue objects within contexts comprised of tools, members of the relevant community, 
divisions of labour, and rules, in the form of ‘explicit and implicit norms, conventions and social 
relations within a community’ (Engström 2000; Kuutti 1997: 28).  Objects, and the other elements that 
comprise activities, may change as those activities proceed. Activities are ‘longer-term formulations’ 
typically comprising several steps or phases, for example, writing a conference paper. They consist of 
chains of actions, such as deciding on a topic, gathering references, reading, writing, revising, and so 
on. At a more fundamental level, actions ‘consist of chains of operations, which are well-defined 
habitual routines used as answers to conditions faced during the performing of the action’ (Kuutti 
1997: 30-1), such as switching on the computer, using a database, printing and typing. The activity 
provides the context for the actions and operations.  
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For the purposes of this paper, activity theory offers some useful concepts through which to examine 
the activities, actions and operations involved in establishing and maintaining information security.  
For activities to run smoothly, the various contextual features need to be more or less aligned.  Often, 
and this is particularly relevant to security practices, users experience ‘contradictions’, or ‘problems, 
ruptures, breakdowns, clashes’ that occur when there is ‘a misfit within elements, between them, 
between different activities, or between different developmental phases of a single activity’ (Kuutti 
1997: 34).  An example relating to information security would be the tensions many of us feel when 
we make decisions about passwords. Do we opt for convenience, using an easily remembered, 
unchanging password for multiple uses, or do we privilege security, struggling to memorise multiple 
unwieldy combinations of numbers and letters, which change frequently?  Such tensions or 
‘contradictions,’ to use the term more common in activity theory, may provide opportunities for 
learning and innovation. However, this is not necessarily the case.  First, tensions or contradictions 
need to be perceived as such.  Second, they have to matter enough to become the objects of a new 
round of activity, namely, problem solving.  
 
There is some work that has examined information security from the ‘ordinary’ (non-technically 
trained) user’s point of view.  While very little of this work has explicitly examined security tasks in 
the context of potentially contradictory work pressures and demands, extant findings generally support 
the claims made above about the perceived tensions between security demands and the pressure of 
other tasks. However, there is much more work to be done.  We now review existing work on 
information security from the user’s point of view in the light of the above discussion, before returning 
to problems and prospects for further research.   
 
INFORMATION SECURITY FROM THE USER’S PERSEPCTIVE  
 
Information security and ‘real’ work 
 
Although malicious attacks by external hackers can wreak havoc with an organisation’s information 
systems, many ICT experts believe that insecure actions by employees, characterised by one group of 
researchers as ‘dangerous tinkering' and 'naive mistakes' (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton 
2005), are largely responsible for breaches, and for leaving companies open to attack from outside 
(Dinnie 1999; Pahnila et al. 2007).  Insecure actions on the part of employees can include poor 
password practices, failure to update virus protection software, opening dangerous attachments, 
supplying personal information to ‘phishers’, and leaving ‘logged on’ computers unattended  (Besnard 
and Arief 2004; Dourish et al. 2004; Gross and Rosson 2007).   
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Despite the apparent prevalence of these insecure actions, empirical research into users’ attitudes has 
found that they often do profess an awareness of security. The problem is that the practice of security 
is hedged about with uncertainties and compromises (Adams and Sasse 1999; Dourish et al. 2004; 
Gross and Rosson 2007).  Clearly, there is much more to the establishment and maintenance of 
security than an awareness of its importance.  Secure and insecure actions and operations, and their 
relationships to ‘knowledge’ and ‘awareness’, need to be examined in the overall context of computer-
mediated activities. This as an area of HCI that is seriously under-researched.  In a recent paper, Gross 
and Rosson (2007) went so far as to claim that ‘no work has yet investigated why user action and 
belief are inconsistent’.  While there has indeed been very little deliberate and systematic research 
along these lines, enough is known about the nature of computer-mediated work and risk perceptions 
to enable some speculation.     
 
People at work use information technology to accomplish tasks, for example, the creation and 
maintenance of databases, the writing of reports, communication with colleagues, and research. These 
activities and actions constitute the ‘real’ work of employees, the tasks that occupy most of their time 
and attention. They are pursued within contexts containing technologies, colleagues, divisions of 
labour and formal and informal rules that guide the action.  Jobs are rendered doable by aligning these 
contextual factors in ways that support getting the ‘real’ work done, that is, achieving the salient 
objects. If we conceptualise work this way, we can appreciate how and why the establishment and 
maintenance of information security can become problematic.  In pursuing the ‘real’ work, security 
measures can be experienced as obstructions or contradictions.  Adams and Sasse (1999: 43) found this 
to be the case when they surveyed and interviewed users about passwords:  ‘Users [...] perceive many 
security mechanisms as laborious and unnecessary – an overhead that gets in the way of their real 
work’. Dourish et al. (2004: 394) reported similar findings, particularly among their younger, more 
technologically experienced interview subjects: ‘They were more likely to talk about security in terms 
of its costs as well as its benefits, and frame technical security measures as ones that can interfere with 
the practical accomplishment of work’.  
 
Employees engaged in ‘real’ work often have fairly clear ideas about what the object(s) of the activity 
is/are, how the tools work, and where their responsibilities lie.  Security work is much more nebulous. 
As Gross and Rosson (2007) point out ‘end-user security management is not task-oriented – it lacks 
the specific goals, resources, boundaries, and constraints that mark tasks’. Although it encapsulates a 
‘high-level objective’ (2007:2), it is not as goal-oriented or as time-bounded as many ‘normal’ work 
tasks.  There is no beginning or end to security work, and users receive little feedback concerning their 
efforts, or lack of efforts.  The outcome of the work – the end-result – is not clear. Also, as many 
organisations employ specialised ICT staff, non-ICT employees are aware of a division of labour 
regarding ICT tasks. However, because security is not a core task for them, they are unclear as to 
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where their own responsibilities lie, relative to those of the ICT personnel. Users often delegate 
responsibility for security to the ICT staff  (Dourish et al. 2004; Foltz and Hauser 2005; Gross and 
Rosson 2007). The non-core nature of security work, coupled with the opportunity of shifting 
responsibility to the ICT staff, helps explain why users tend not to be very knowledgeable about 
security threats and the mechanisms devised to prevent them.  General awareness is there, but detailed 
knowledge is often lacking (Dourish et al. 2004; Foltz and Hauser 2005; Gross and Rosson 2007). 
From the perspective of post-cognitivist HCI, this is precisely what we would expect. People pursue 
and acquire knowledge within the contexts of the activities that are meaningful to them. If users 
perceive security as peripheral, annoying or someone else’s problem, they will hardly be motivated to 
inform themselves about it (Fisk 2002).   
 
Users’ attitudes to security and their engagements with it are clearly complex and sometimes 
contradictory.  Attempts by researchers to investigate the contextual factors that impinge on users’ 
practices and beliefs about security fall into different categories.  First, there are theoretical models that 
try to bring the various factors together, and explore relationships among them.  In some cases, these 
form the basis for surveys and statistical analyses (Gonzalez and Sawicka 2002; Kotulic and Clark 
2004; Pahnila et al. 2007; Woon and Pee 2004).  For example, Pahnila et al. (2007) found that while 
sanctions and rewards have little impact on the practice of securiety, ‘attitudes, normative beliefs and 
habits have [a] significant effect on intention to comply with IS security policies’.  While these studies 
are useful for establishing statistical correlations among variables in the populations studied, they 
cannot capture the rich textures of compromise, confusion and creativity that become evident when the 
research methods employed are more open-ended and qualitative.   
 
Such studies of user practices and perceptions are rare. Dourish et al.  (2004) conducted interviews 
with 20 employees in two organisations. The employees in their sample managed security in 
unexpected ways that were often technically simple, but effective.  For example, they deliberately used 
vague language, such as ‘I took the actions you requested’, in emails containing sensitive information, 
as this was much easier than using encryption tools. They also ‘switched media’, that is, used the 
telephone or spoke face-to-face to convey sensitive information (2004:397). They arranged their 
offices so that computer screens faced away from prying eyes. In other words, security practices were 
not confined to on-line technologies, but managed more holistically within the physical work space 
with its multiple tools and relationships.  Another manifestation of users’ tendency to view ‘security’ 
in holistic terms was their disinterest in making the same sorts of distinctions that IT experts do.  For 
example, spam, viruses and passwords sniffers were lumped together as problems, and solutions, such 
as firewalls,  were perceived to be effective against all possible threats (2004:394).   
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Gross and Rosson (2007) reported similar findings from their interviews with 12 users from a range of 
different organisations.  These users were aware of the sensitivity of the information they handled, and 
took measures, sometimes physical (locking rooms and computers), to keep it secure.  The majority 
reported taking care with passwords,  and being suspicious of email requests for personal details 
(‘phishing’).  Again, however, most were unclear about the technical details of security threats and 
protective devices.  They confused viruses with worms, and were unsure about their computers’ virus 
protection capacities.  In another example of ordinary users’ tendency to view security holistically, 
interview subjects in this sample tended to conflate security with functionality.  In discussing threats, 
many did not distinguish between external attacks or internal software faults.  Such distinctions were 
of little or no relevance compared to the main items of interest – the functionality of the computer and 
the availability of data.   
 
We can, therefore, perceive security work as a potentially contradictory element within overlapping 
structures of activity.  Users perform security-related actions in the course of their ‘real’ work, but the 
tools used to perform them are often mystifying, and the actions themselves can delay, complicate and 
obstruct the main line of activity.  Users often try to resolve contradictions by ignoring, downplaying 
or circumventing those aspects of security that they perceive as too intrusive or technically confusing.  
They sometimes devise their own, more comprehensible modes of dealing with sensitive information, 
and frequently delegate the technical details of information security to others who are perceived to be 
more knowledge than they are.   
 
Perceptions of risk 
 
In this section of the paper we focus on the uncertainties surrounding the object of security activities.  
An intangible or tangible object, such as ‘security’ or ‘a secure system’, provides a unifying motive 
and rationale for those engaged in a particular activity. It is the ‘something’ that differentiates one set 
of actions and operations from another, a ‘something’ that can be jointly manipulated and transformed 
by those who participate in it (Kuutti 1997: 27).   However, as we saw above, many end-users 
participate only reluctantly, uncertainly or sporadically in security activities, as their priorities and 
areas of expertise lie elsewhere.  How do users view security as an object?  To answer this question, 
we need to consider the concept of risk, as it is the perception and prevention of risk that gives security 
activities their meaning and purpose.  As Dourish and Anderson note, ‘formulations of privacy and 
security must, implicitly or explicitly, draw on or respond to models of risk and danger’ (2006: 322).   
 
Many writers in the field of information security, under the influence of cognitivist theories of 
information processing, assume that users are rational actors who, once informed of the ‘objective’ 
threats to security, will adjust their behaviour accordingly (Dourish and Anderson 2006: 325-7).  
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Increasingly, however, theorists in information technology, as well as across a range of disciplines, 
including sociology, psychology and economics, are abandoning the notion that people perceive and 
respond to risks in ways that reflect ‘objective’ expert assessments of the dangers that exist ‘out there’.  
Instead,  assessments of risk are influenced by emotions, the way information is presented, the 
perceived proximity in time and space of the perceived threats, and particularly the cultural and social 
meanings of the putative threats within the individual’s community (Dourish and Anderson 2006; 
Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006).   
 
Work that has examined users’ perceptions of information security risks confirms this latter view.  In a 
large survey of the Swedish general public, Sjöberg and Fromm (2001) found that users were generally 
well-disposed towards information technology.  They rated ‘IT risks’, which included virus infection, 
invasions of privacy and credit card fraud as ‘quite small when considered as personal risks, but quite 
sizable when considered as risks for others’ (433).  The authors of the study found this quite 
interesting, as lay people generally overestimate risks to themselves from new technologies, and see 
themselves and others as more or less equally susceptible to danger.  To account for these unusual 
findings, Sjöberg and Fromm suggested that because users ‘are actually operating the technology, 
something that never happens in cases such as nuclear power’,  they feel a sense of familiarity and 
control (438).  Relatively few had experienced security problems  -- 3.5% had been infected with a 
virus via the internet, 3.9% by virus via email, 0.6% experienced credit card fraud, and 1.3% privacy 
intrusion (434).  Sizable segments of the survey population reported taking preventive actions against 
these, such as using antivirus programs (41.1%) and aliases (7.6%) or refusing to use credit cards on 
the internet (51.8%).  Given these numbers, it is not surprising that users perceived themselves, from 
their personal experience, to be at relatively low risk and in control of keeping risks at bay.  For some 
commentators on information security, lay perceptions such as these, which are based on personal 
experience, are deeply problematic.  They are evidence that users ‘lack knowledge’.  For example, 
Adams and Sasse (1999) wrote ‘users are not sufficiently informed about security issues. This causes 
them to construct their own model of possible security threats and the importance of security and these 
are often wildly inaccurate.  Users tend to be guided by what they actually see – or don't' (43, emphasis 
added). 
 
The relationship between perceptions of risk based on what users actually experience and their more 
general beliefs about the dangers that lurk ‘out there’ in cyber space is particularly interesting.  In the 
Swedish study just cited,  personal experiences contributed to a downplaying of threat to the self.  
However, the broader threats were still recognised quite strongly, in the form of perceived risks to 
others.  In their interview-based study of security practices in two U. S. companies, Dourish et al. 
(2004) provide some additional insights into how users perceive these more distant and less 
controllable sources of risk.  Among their subjects, they found ‘an overwhelming sense of futility’ 
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regarding hackers and stalkers who, they thought, would ‘always be one step ahead’.   These 
perceptions created frustration, and a ‘fictive norm of adequate protection, against which people 
continually find themselves wanting’ (394).  In other words, the object of security practices is 
paradoxical and ultimately elusive.  While on a day-to-day basis, we may experience our own 
computers as relatively safe, particularly if we follow routine precautions,  we can never be sure.  The 
killer virus may be just about to attack, and someone may have stolen our identity without our 
knowledge.  Someone out there might have our credit details.  The nebulousness and uncertainty 
surrounding security, particularly the fact that we never really know whether we are secure or not,  has 
significant implications for learning, and for the management of information security in organizations.    
 
CONCLUSION: FURTHERING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
There are many possibilities for research which emerge from these observations and findings. Post-
cognitivist HCI, and particularly the concepts and relationships suggested by activity theory, holds 
promise for improving our understanding of the social and cultural contexts that influence the 
establishment and maintenance of secure ICT practices.  Within this perspective, research can focus on 
different levels.  
 
Individual level  
 
At an individual level, further work is needed to understand the compromises and the inventiveness of 
employees in ensuring ICT security. For example, it would be useful to investigate how individual 
users’ simple, non-technical actions and operations interact with broad-based technical tools and 
actions, and how the users’ ‘mental models’ of security may either compromise or enhance it. It will be 
particularly important to understand how these mental models play themselves out in situations of 
conflict or tension arising from other tasks. 
 
Group or community level  
 
In addition, more needs to be known about how different groups of users may experience tensions with 
regard to security practices, and how individuals’ perceptions of responsibility for security may be 
influenced by their membership of a particular community of practice (Wenger 1998). Groups likely to 
be of interest include expert and non-technically specialised users, but other groups may also be 
worthy of investigation. For example, we might usefully consider differences in perceptions of 
responsibility for security between work groups who see themselves as handling sensitive information 
and those who don’t see themselves this way but whose interactions with ICT may still inadvertently 
or occasionally maliciously expose the organisation to security risk.  
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Inter-group comparisons  
 
We might also compare groups by asking questions such as: Are there recurring patterns in the types of 
security tensions experienced by users in various groups? How do groups vary, if at all, in how they 
manage, if not resolve, these tensions in their day to day work? What contextual factors, including the 
difference kinds of work performed in particular groups, influence the situated decision-making about 
perceived conflicts between ‘security’ aspects and ‘real’ aspects of tasks? In what work or other 
contexts are tensions or contradictions absent and does this differ between groups?  
 
From groups to cultures  
 
We might derive new practical questions focussed on improving ICT security, aided by a more 
sophisticated understanding of how individuals and groups incorporate understandings and practices 
around security into the context of their work. Influenced by this contextual focus, some changes and 
extensions to the traditional, technically-focussed research approach suggest themselves.  For example: 
How might understandings of situated learning, for example, learning within communities of practice 
(Wenger 1998) allow us to see how group ‘solutions’ to security tensions become entrenched? Beyond 
this, to what extent do particular groups’ ‘solutions’ – understood as local ways of managing tensions 
around security and other work demands - become part of an organisation’s culture? How might an 
organisation’s security culture(s) be influenced by interventions within the separate communities of 
practice within the organisation? 
 
Exemplary organisations  
 
As well as studying different approaches to ICT security in organisations in general, it could be 
valuable to examine the approach to ICT security of organisations which have had an exemplary ICT 
security record. At first glance this may seem counter-intuitive. After all, the tradition of researching 
various forms of organisational failure, such as studies of the Columbia space shuttle disaster, is well 
established. This tradition has led to important insights into how aspects of organisational culture may 
affect specific decisions resulting sometimes in catastrophic error. The assumption is that other 
organisations can avoid similar errors by studying what went wrong in a particular case.  
 
However this is not the only possible approach or even the most apt for ICT security. It is often 
pointed out that the nature of ICT attacks changes frequently, typically in the direction of greater 
sophistication, so that that fixes often lag behind technical understandings of the problem, even in 
‘expert’ environments. Nevertheless over time some organisations, through attention to specific non-
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technical as well as technical practices may be shown to have performed better than other, apparently 
similar organisations at managing achieving the vague, ephemeral goal of better ICT security. Similar 
questions might be asked of them as need also to be asked about achieving better occupational health 
and safety records. How do some organisations manage to fend off or be immune to a particularly 
pervasive virus when others succumb? What were the users in the unscathed organisation doing or 
thinking differently? How might these thought processes be transferred to less well performing 
organisations? 
 
Insights from team research  
 
Finally, it may make sense to apply insights from areas of knowledge which link individual and group-
based work via teams. An example is Katzenbach and Smith’s (1993) analysis of the problems and 
advantages of different kinds of team structures. These researchers found that, although all teams have 
some common needs, specific team structures impose some special requirements for the team to 
function effectively. For example, ‘assembly line’ teams have to deal with the fact that their work does 
not naturally throw up markers of progress and achievement. Such teams need to invent and interpose 
their own performance measurements so that members can inform themselves of the team’s 
achievements and celebrate them appropriately. The endless, ephemeral ‘no news is good news’ nature 
of much ICT security work suggests a parallel with this type of team. Research could thus focus on 
how to manage the ICT security work process to impose achievement markers – beacons in the 
nebulous security landscape.  
 
These research approaches incorporate an awareness that ICT security risks often appear both far away 
and trivial so it is difficult for people to maintain a sense of urgency about them. At the same time the 
tools for ensuring security often appear unfamiliar and mystifying, and yet unimportant for non-
technically specialised users. Combining this with an unclear division of labour and mental models 
which may be wildly inaccurate add to the zones of uncertainty around ICT security. The research 
agenda set out here suggests that context-based research into how users actually think about, devise, 
reject, employ, and improvise work routines affecting computer security will be vital for understanding 
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